Download Moral Hazard in Health Insurance by Amy Finkelstein, Kenneth Arrow, Jonathan Gruber, Joseph PDF

By Amy Finkelstein, Kenneth Arrow, Jonathan Gruber, Joseph Newhouse, Joseph E. Stiglitz

Ethical hazard--the tendency to alter habit whilst the price of that habit might be borne by way of others--is a very difficult query while contemplating well-being care. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal 1963 paper in this subject (included during this quantity) was once one of many first to discover the implication of ethical danger for well-being care, and Amy Finkelstein--recognized as one of many world's preferable specialists at the topic--here examines this factor within the context of latest American health and wellbeing care policy.
Drawing on study from either the unique RAND medical insurance scan and her personal examine, together with a 2008 medical health insurance scan in Oregon, Finkelstein offers compelling facts that medical health insurance does certainly impact scientific spending and encourages coverage recommendations that recognize and account for this. the quantity additionally good points commentaries and insights from different well known economists, together with an creation by way of Joseph P. Newhouse that gives context for the dialogue, a remark from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side ethical chance, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow.

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Sample text

WHO SELECTS HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE PLANS? A second and related issue in trying to forecast the likely spending reduction from introducing a high-deductible plan is the question: Who is going to select it? In general, we tend to think of selection and moral hazard as distinct issues. The adverse selection literature has focused on the fact that individuals may differ in their (privately known) underlying health, and that this is going to affect their demand for health insurance. The moral hazard literature has tended to ignore heterogeneity across individuals and just focus on average price sensitivity or the average slope of the demand curve.

I have to use the term coauthor quite loosely—you could imagine Amy as a rocket, zooming off into the stratosphere, and me just trying to hang on. I received literally dozens of e-mails from Amy each day, so fast that I couldn’t respond before I got another one, and eventually I basically just dropped out. She was kind enough to continue to keep my name on the paper, but I’m still shuffling through the e-mails years later. It’s really just a pleasure and an enormous privilege to get to work with Amy on a project.

I think we have made some progress, but, naturally, important questions remain. Let just mention a few of them, although I am sure there are many more: Where does moral hazard come from? How much of it comes from the patient and how much of it comes from the doctor? Clearly, the decision to go to the doctor initially is primarily driven by the patient, but once there, how much of the decision of what care to get and how to adjust care based on the patient’s insurance coverage is driven by the patient and how much by the doctor?

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